Non-compact symmetries cannot be fully broken by randomness since non-compact Lie groups have no invariant probability distributions. In particular, this makes trickier the``Copernican"" random choice of the place of the observer in infinite cosmology models.
A technical difficulty comes up here. While, the observable part of the world is finite, many models include it in a greater infinite realm, beyond our reach. How to choose our (observer's) place in this realm at random is puzzling. Say, in a most primitive setting, how to choose a random point in a pattern on an infinite Euclidean space? There is no uniform probability distribution there. (In other models, where ours is one of the infinitely many``bubbles,"" it may be even much trickier.) A way around this technicality can lie in the reverse order of choices. Instead of first building an infinite universe and then choosing the place of the observer there, we can do the opposite: first designate the observer, then build an infinite universe around her. This circumvents the lack of uniform distributions in infinite domains (and tickles our ego, besides :-).
This brings up a question, what is an observer? Its many meanings depend on what symmetries are meant to be broken by choosing this sort of a``gauge"". In quantum physics observer can mean a macroscopic system brought into an entanglement with the observed microscopic variables.``Macroscopic"" is a vague term with unclear relevance. Sometimes it is put in relation with the Plank mass (e.g., by R.Penrose). But it is unclear why a microscopic bacteria, much lighter than Plank mass, cannot perfectly serve as an observer. (It could transmit its observed data to its descendants, which may include members of Royal Society. :-)
\ast Computer Science dept., 111 Cummington Mall, Boston, MA 02215. Home page: http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/Lnd/ 1 Algorithmic randomness (see: [Kolmogorov 65, Kolmogorov, Uspenskii 87]) of a digital sequence \omega does not quite assure it obeys all probability 1 math laws (only computable ones). Yet, it assures (see: [Levin 84 ]) that \omega either obeys all such laws or has an infinite information about some uncomputable but mathematically definable object. The latter case would be really weird. There are no ways for such \omega to be generated; see this informational version of Church-Turing Thesis discussed at the end of [Levin 13 ].
What seems relevant here, is that the observed data, unlike generic quantum states, can be reliably copied, preserved, transmitted, etc. For this an observer needs some sophistication, access to mechanisms for errorcorrection, self-preservation, etc. 2 Such features are readily present in life.
Our world is in a state that harbors life, however mysterious is life's origin. The present living creatures developed by evolution. But for evolution even to start, it needs systems fully capable of copying themselves, along with accumulated random mutations. The first such systems could not be produced by evolution, so must appear spontaneously. The minimal complexity C of such systems may be significant, and the chance P of their spontaneous generation too tiny: 1/P , exponential in C, exceeding cosmological scales.
If so, how to deal with these tiny probabilities? It may be that the laws of physics are fine-tuned to boost them. 3 But it may be that this fine-tuning requires high complexity of such fine-tuned laws, which just transfers the tiny probability issue from live systems to laws of physics. However, the mystery seems to soften with the abovementioned priority of choosing the observer. If models start with choosing an observer (and then building a universe around it) then the worlds with no observers are excluded before computing the probabilities.
Such settings may also help with another issue. Some fundamental laws of physics seem to yield paradoxes or even conflict with each other. But it may suffice for our needs if the laws are only approximately sound. For instance, the observer cannot be absolutely reliable. It may spontaneously tunnel into something entirely different, albeit with an exponentially small probability. A theory may be clear if such effects are ignored, assuming the observer behaves``as advertised"". And it may be O.K. for the theory to become incomprehensible if negligible likelihoods, such as, e.g., observer's drastic tunneling, must be accounted for.
